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Thus both the public and the plaintiff benefited from the
plaintiff's action and the court's decision. At some point,
however, a court may have to complete the delineation, begun in
Burns, of the rights of various parties. The court mentioned that
the plaintiff is subject to public regulation, but it deliberately
declined to set forth to what extent and for what purposes the
plaintiff's beach/wharf may be regulated.3 4 Undoubtedly the
plaintiff's right to due process must be observed if authorities seek
to regulate his beach/wharf. 5 But will he have to share his
beach/wharf with the public to a greater extent than if he had
built a conventional dock?36 Can others make use of his
beach/wharf for their own boating, swimming or camping purposes?37 Is it possible that the government might take over the
new land as public beach to such an extent that the plaintiff's use of
3
the land as a wharf might become impracticable if not impossible?
The case has interesting facts and an imaginative solution.
The court went a long way to protect the plaintiff's rights as a
riparian owner. It also protected the public's rights in what had
been submerged land. In so doing it reached a result that seems
fair and legally sound but which leaves some interesting questions
unanswered. These questions may require future decisions giving
preference to either the public or the private owner, when those
rights become incompatible.
Jack L. Schoellerman
MAINTENANCE AND CURE-JONES
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Williamson v. Western-Pacific Dredging
Corporation(D. Ore. 1969).

TRANSPORTATION.

Maintenance and cure and damages for wrongful death under
the Jones Act' were the counts involved in an action brought by
33. 412 F.2d at 998. See also, text accompanying note 23 supra.

34. 412 F.2d at 998.
35. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
36. See Tiffany v.Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 136 N.E. 224 (1922).
37. Id.

38. Id.; see also, text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
1. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
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the administratrix of the estate and widow of deceased Joel
Dwaine Williamson. Williamson was seriously injured in an
automobile accident on December 21, 1967 while enroute from his
home in Clarkamas, Oregon to work on the dredge H. W.
McCurdy operating in the Columbia River near Woodland,
Washington. He died the same day at-a Vancouver, Washington
hospital as a result of the injuries suffered in the accident. A
fellow-employee, third party defendant Don L. Ferguson, owned
2
and operated the vehicle at the time of the accident.
Defendant Western-Pacific Dredging Corporation is an
Oregon corporation with its principal place of business in
Portland, Oregon and is owner and operator of the dredge, H. W.
McCurdy. At the time of the accident the McCurdy was being
operated by the defendant in the performance of a contract with
the United States Army Corps of Engineers in connection with
dredging the Columbia River for the purpose of maintaining and
improving the channel for use in navigation and commerce.
Williamson had been employed by the defendant for more
than two years, first as a deck hand and subsequently as a mate
on the McCurdy. The McCurdy was at the time of Williamson's
death using three shifts of eight hours each per day. WesternPacific rotated the shifts so that its employees would work one
week on the day, the next week on the swing, and the following
week on the graveyard shift. Western-Pacific designated a point
on shore to which the employees reported to be picked up and
discharged by launch at the beginning and end of each shift. Each
employee, by virtue of a union contract, was entitled to and
allotted "travel pay" of $4.00 per day by the defendant. Each
employee was subject to work extra hours past the end of his
regular shift if a member of the succeeding shift did not report
for work. Defendant had a policy, which was not enforced, that
required each employee to use his own automobile in going to and
coming from work. Defendant did not provide sleeping quarters
on board the McCurdy, thus requiring its employees to go ashore
for each sleeping period. Western-Pacific provided coverage under
the Workmen's Compensation Law of the State of Oregon
through a contract with Argonaut Insurance Company, a
2. The issues between third-party plaintiff, Western-Pacific, and third party
defendant, Ferguson, were segregated prior to trial. Williamson's action under the Jones
Act can be only against the employer.
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California corporation. It also provided a health and accident
insurance plan which paid for Williamson's medical expenses. An
accidental death life insurance policy provided for by WesternPacific had a $2,500 death benefit and an additional $2,500
benefit for an off-the-job death. The widow applied for and
received the full $5,000.
The administratrix of the deceased brought an action for
maintenance and cure, and for damages for wrongful death under
the Jones Act in the United States District Court for the Oregon
District, sitting in Admiralty. Held: both Williamson and thirdparty defendant Ferguson were seamen in the "service of the
ship" at the time of the accident so as to permit an award for
maintenance and cure and for damages under the Jones Act to the
administratrix of Williamson's estate. Williamson v. WesternPacific Dredging Corporation,304 F. Supp. 509 (D. Ore. 1969).
In Williamson the court discussed three specific areas relative
to awarding compensation for the injury or death of a "seaman."
These areas were 1) Compensation Acts, 2) Maintenance and
Cure, and 3) the Jones Act.
The court initially considered the applicability to the injured
seaman of both the Oregon Workmen's Compensation Act 3 and
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act.4
The court conceded that a "twilight" zone may exist in which a
seaman may elect to pursue a state-oriented remedy under a state
workmen's compensation act, a state employment liability act, or
to press a federal claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.' The -court concluded that benefits
under the Oregon Workmen's Compensation Act are not
available to an injured workman, or his beneficiaries, if protection
is provided by the laws of the United States' and that the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
specifically excludes from coverage a member of the crew of a
vessel.7 Accordingly, the finding that Williamson was a member
of the crew of the McCurdy prohibited recovery under the
Compensation Acts.
3. ORE. REV.STATS. § 656.126(1) (1969).

4. 33 U.S.C. § 901-50 (1964).
5. Williamson v. Western-Pacific Dredging Corporation, 304 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.

Ore. 1969).
6. Id. at 514, ORE. REv. STATS. § 656.027(4) (1969).

7. Id. at 514,33 U.S.C. § 903(a)(1) (1964).
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The liability for maintenance and cure of a seaman becoming
ill or injured during the period of his service has since ancient
times been imposed on shipowners.8 In the United States this
obligation has been recognized as an implied provision in
contracts of marine employment.' To sustain an action for
maintenance and cure a plaintiff has the burden of showing 1) his
employment as a seaman, 2) his illness or injury occuring while
in the ship's service, and 3) the cost of the maintenance and cure:1
Negligence of the shipowner, the crew, or unseaworthiness of the
ship do not enter into consideration as to the recovery. The
remedy of maintenance and cure has been held to be a broader
liability than that imposed by workmen's compensation statutes."
The Williamson court found that Williamson was a seaman
2
acting in the service of his ship at the time of the fatal injuries,'
and held plaintiff entitled to prevail on the issue of maintenance
and cure.13 In reaching this decision the court reviewed a series of
cases allowing maintenance and cure where injury was away from
the ship; for a seaman injured while crossing a dock on returning
to his ship when this was the only available route between the ship
and the public street; 4 for injury to a seaman occuring in a shorefront area about a mile from the ship;" and for a seaman injured
in a dance hall some distance from the waterfront." A possible
distinction between the above cases and the facts in Williamson
(i.e., that decedent commuted to his home each day after his work
shift) was avoided by reference to Weiss v. Central Ry. of New
Jersey. 7 There the court refused to deny a seamen his right to
maintenance and cure because he slept ashore at night. The court
applied a test which requires that the seaman be generally
answerable to a call to duty rather than actually in the
performance of routine tasks or specific orders to be in the service
of the ship. In holding Williamson answerable to the call of duty
8. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
9. Id.
10. Id., Telano v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 114 N.Y.S. 2d 687 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1952).
11. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
12. 304 F. Supp. at 515,
13. Id. at 516.
14. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
15. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949). The court permitted maintenance

and cure during the seaman's period of hospitalization but denied maintenance for life.
16. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
17. 235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956).
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at the time of his injury the court made specific reference to
defendant's failure to provide sleeping quarters on board the
McCurdy, thus requiring its seaman to go home for each sleeping
period, and the'payment by the defendant to its seamen employees
an allowance for the travel to and from the vessel. 18 The court
acknowledged that the award of maintenance and cure on the
facts of Williamson was going "somewhat outside the perimeter
of established case law" but used as its rationale the rather
nebulous argument of a need for flexibility for the protection of
seamen in an ever expanding field of admiralty.19
Whereas mere status as a seaman allows recovery under
maintenance and cure, negligence is the gravemen of a suit under
the Jones Act.20 This act affords an injured seaman a statutory
cause of action for negligently inflicted injuries suffered in the
course of employment. It calls for an action at law at the election
of the seaman and sets forth the right of trial by jury. The
negligence must be alleged and proved by the seaman.21 To sustain
an action under the Jones Act the plaintiff must prove that he is
a seaman acting in the course of his employment at the time of
the injury and that the injury was caused by, or attributable to,
his employer.Y The Federal Employer's Liability Act23 (FELA)
which provides the rules of decision for Jones Act cases creates a
cause of action for employees who incur "injury or death resulting
in whole or part from the negligence of the officers, agents, or
employees of such carrier. ....24
The court in deciding the maintenance and cure issue found
Williamson to be a seaman in the service of the ship at the time
of the accident.2" This was applied in the discussion under the
Jones Act to find both Williamson and Ferguson, the driver, to
be seamen in the course of their employment for Jones Act
purposes. 21 Particular emphasis was placed on Braen v. Pfeifer Oil
Transportation Co. 27 where in discussing the decisions since
18. 304 F. Supp. at 516.
19. Id. at 515.
20. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964),45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
21. Mullen v. Fitz Simmons and Connell Dredge and Dock Co., 191 F.2d 82 (7th
Cir. 1951).
22. Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transportation Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959).

23. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
24. Id.
25. 304 F. Supp. at 515,516.
26. Id. at 516.
27. 361 U.S. 129 (1959).
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Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co.21 and Warren v. United States29 the
Supreme Court of the United States said, "They also supply
relevent guides to the meaning of the term 'course of employment'
under the Act since it is the equivalent of the 'service of the ship'
formula used in maintenance and cure cases."0
The court found additional support for the award of damages
under the Jones Act by noting that under Workmen's
Compensation cases both Williamson and Ferguson would b6
viewed as being in the course of their employment at the time the
accident occurred.3 1 The court in awarding damages under the
Jones Act admitted that, as with its maintenance and cure award,
it went beyond established case law, but said:
Although a finding for plaintiff on this record is invading
virgin territory, yet untouched by judicial decision, the courts
must recognize the monumental march of our present
civilization, particularly in the transportation sphere.
Inasmuch as defendant found it to its advantage to pay to its
employees a fixed transportation fee, rather than provide
quarters aboard the ship, it cannot now escape liability by
claiming that decedent and Ferguson were not employees in the
course of their employment. With modern highways and ultramodern and fool proof motor vehicles, the defendant had a
"fielder's choice"; it could provide quarters aboard ship for
decendent and Ferguson, or it could pay the costs of
transportation to and from work. Under the union contract,
it elected to do the latter. Not to be forgotten is the oftstated
dogma that the Jones Act created new rights in seamen arising
out of maritime torts and must be given a liberal construction
in order to accomplish its beneficient purposes."
The court at this point failed to make any mention of
Williamson's possible civil action against Ferguson thereby
relieving the court of the task of extending existing law.
Since seamen have available two distinct remedies, one for
maintenance and cure and another under the Jones Act, the court
in Williamson has in each instance expanded the field of admiralty
law so as to permit recovery for injury or death for a seaman
28. 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
29. 340 U.S. 523 (1951).

30. 361 U.S. at 132, 133.
31. 304 F. Supp. at 517.

32. Id.at 518.
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ashore traveling to or from his ship where his employer has acted
so as to accept a duty with regard to providing safe
transportation. Prior case law has refused to hold the employer
liable for such a duty. In Thurnau v. Alcoa Steamship Co. 3 it was
emphatically held that the employer had no duty to provide safe
transportation between the ship and a place of amusement. In
Williamson the court has recognized that an employer accepts a
duty to provide safe transportation when he has exercised control
over the transportation of his seaman employees by paying a
travel allowance rather than providing sleeping quarters on board
ship and by exerting control, albeit minor, on the mode of travel
of the employees by suggesting that each drive his own car to
work. Once this duty to provide safe transportation has been
established there is little difficulty under the concept of statutory
negligence to impute negligence of fellow-employee Ferguson to
the defendant for Jones Act recovery. No doubt, the employer
assumed a duty by providing a travel allowance and attempting
to control the employee's transportation, but there is no mention
of any possible effect the disregard of the directive by Williamson
had upon the relationship. This disregard could arguably be
viewed as a breach of the agreement by Williamson and thereby
voiding recovery based upon this contract.
In reaching this decision, the court has failed to adequately
deal with a number of most important issues. As mentioned
above, has Williamson by his violation of Western-Pacific's
request that he drive his own car voided any duty that the
employer may have assumed relative to providing safe
transportation; how can Williamson's status be off-the-job for
insurance claim purposes and on-the-job for Jones Act recovery
purposes; can't a workman such as Williamson be a seaman only
when he is on his vessel and not a seaman on his off-duty hours
at home and coming from and going home? It would seem that
under the facts the court, rather than taking such great efforts to
admittedly extend existing law, could have just as easily held
Williamson not to be in the service of his ship at the time of the
accident and thereby allow recovery under the Workmen's
Compensation provisions. Whether this extension was necessary
under these circumstances will perhaps be decided in future
litigation, but the fact remains that possible existing alternatives
were either passed over or not discussed at all.
GEORGE
33. 229 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1956).
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